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Preaching from the State’s Podium: What Speech is 
Proselytizing Prohibited by the Establishment Clause? 
 
Christian M. Keiner* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Public schools, like other public institutions, continue to wrestle with 
difficult problems posed by potential proselytizing in publicly-sponsored 
activities.1 The fundamental First Amendment question is whether 
particular religious-oriented speech or conduct is protected by the Free 
Speech Clause or prohibited by the Establishment Clause.2 Proselytizing 
is unquestionably expressive activity. Be it verbal or written, a 
proselytizing religious message would be protected First Amendment 
speech if the religious content did not raise Establishment Clause 
concerns.3 Indeed, the position has been successfully argued in several 
federal court cases that religious expression is precisely that form of 
speech the “viewpoint discrimination” doctrine, set forth in Rosenberger 
v. Rector4 and its progeny, was designed to protect. As this article will 
show, the term “proselytizing” weaves its way through U.S. Supreme 
 * J.D. with Distinction, University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Order of the Coif; 
B.A. with High Honors, University of California, Santa Barbara. The author is Of Counsel to 
Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard in Sacramento and represents California community 
college districts, school districts, and county offices of education. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the editorial and research assistance of Chelsea R. Olson, J.D. with Distinction, 
University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara.
 1. See Brief of National School Boards Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 8 n.5, McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (No. 03-1693), for a 
comprehensive description of recent church-state conflicts in public schools. A non-school example 
is the ongoing difficulties with regulating proselytizing at the U.S. Air Force Academy. See, e.g., 
Mark Mazzetti, Air Force Chaplain Policy Cited in Faith Bias Case: Guidelines That May Have 
Encouraged Christian Evangelizing Were Rescinded in August According to a Lawyer for the 
Service, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005 at A-17. 
 2. The author has defended public schools in Establishment Clause cases including Cole v. 
Oroville Union High School District, 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000); PLANS, Inc. v. Sacramento 
City Unified School District, 319 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2003); and Sands v. Morongo Unified School 
District, 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991). 
 3. This article only analyzes proselytizing in State-sponsored or State-controlled activities. 
Non-government-sponsored proselytizing or evangelical activity by private individuals or churches 
does not typically raise Establishment Clause concerns. 
 4. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the 
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”). 
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Court opinions that analyze both Establishment Clause prohibitions and 
Free Speech Clause precluded “viewpoint discrimination,” without at 
any point being adequately defined as an applicable legal standard or 
test.5 Justice Kennedy, in his minority concurrence in County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU suggested “proselytizing” be used as the primary 
Establishment Clause test6 but, not gaining support from his fellow 
justices, developed a “coercion” test.7 Most recently, in the 2005 term 
Ten Commandments cases, “proselytizing” appeared to evolve into a 
question of fact, or mixed question of law and fact, rather than a 
conclusion of law.8
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Lee v. Weisman9and 
Santa Fe v. Doe,10 adopted a “no proselytizing” Establishment Clause 
rule in two seminal cases (Cole v. Oroville Union High School District11 
and Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified School District12), at least with 
respect to California public school graduation ceremonies.  Other federal 
circuits, while not so definite, have stated in dicta that proselytizing in 
State-sponsored or State-controlled activities is beyond First Amendment 
Free Speech clause protection.13
This article will analyze dilemmas posed by proselytizing expression 
primarily in public school-sponsored activities and will (1) discuss the 
evolving use of the term “proselytizing” in U.S. Supreme Court opinions 
culminating in the 2005 term Ten Commandments cases and while doing 
so, briefly set forth key High Court decisions involving either 
Establishment Clause prohibited speech or Free Speech Clause protected 
speech; (2) analyze how the Ninth Circuit interpreted these High Court 
Establishment Clause cases to adopt a “no proselytizing” rule, and reject 
the applicability of the “viewpoint discrimination” theory (at least in high 
 5. See discussion infra Part II. 
 6. County of Allegheny  v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659–64 
(1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 7. In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) Justice Kennedy articulated a new 
formulation of the Establishment Clause test known as the “coercion test,” determining that Daniel 
Weisman and his daughter, middle school graduate, Deborah Weisman were victims of 
impermissible psychological coercion. Justice Kennedy stated that such coercion exists where school 
officials conduct formal religious observance at an important ceremonial event creating an 
environment where “subtle coercive pressures exist and where the student ha[s] no real alternative 
which would . . . allow[] her to avoid [either] the fact or appearance of participation” in the religious 
component of the graduation ceremony. Id. 
 8. See generally McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. 
Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
 9. Lee, 505 U.S. 577. 
 10. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 11. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
 12. Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 13. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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school graduation ceremonies); (3) review how other federal circuits 
have approached such speech situations and attempted to define 
“proselytizing”; and (4) propose a more certain legal definition that could 
both mitigate the potential for impinging on free speech rights and avoid 
violation of the Establishment Clause. Although this article’s focus will 
be on public schools, the cases and principles discussed are applicable to 
other government institutions. 
Finally, this article will suggest that an ethic of mutual tolerance 
might serve to resolve practical issues associated with proposed 
proselytizing in State-sponsored activities. 
 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT AND PROSELYTIZING 
 
As set forth below, early U.S. Supreme Court opinions recognized 
the bedrock concept of “no proselytizing” in publicly-sponsored 
activities and emphasized that any proselytizing bearing the imprimatur 
of the State violates the Establishment Clause. However, the concept that 
government-sponsored proselytizing breaches the Establishment Clause 
appears so central to the judicial understanding that individual justices 
never defined the term “proselytize,” much less provided any workable 
legal test for determining precisely what qualifies as prohibited 
proselytizing. Despite this definitional lapse, the concept of proselytizing 
lies at the heart of opinions addressing both Free Speech Clause 
prohibited “viewpoint discrimination” and Establishment Clause 
prohibited publicly-sponsored “religious exercise.” The final irony is that 
the “no proselytizing” concept has been acknowledged and recognized 
by justices conventionally deemed liberal, conservative, and moderate 
alike. 
 
A.  Proselytizing and the Establishment Clause 
 
Proselytizing was first addressed in the public school context in 
Justice Robert H. Jackson’s 1948 concurrence in McCollum v. Board of 
Education.14 McCollum reversed a state court opinion upholding 
religious instruction in public schools.15 In that case, religious classes 
were held in regular classrooms during the school day.16 Though students 
were not required to attend and could go elsewhere in the building for 
continued “secular instruction,” the Court determined that merely 
 14. Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235–36 (1948) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 15. Id. at 212 (majority opinion). 
 16. Id. at 205. 
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allowing the instruction to take place infringed upon the Establishment 
Clause.17 Justice Jackson, in his concurrence, stated, “[we] can at all 
times . . . forbid forthright proselytizing in the schools” and that “[w]hen 
instruction turns to proselytizing and imparting knowledge becomes 
evangelism is, except in the crudest cases, a subtle inquiry.”18 In this 
early opinion, the Justice acknowledged that while government-
sponsored proselytizing is an Establishment Clause violation, there is a 
subtle inquiry involved in determining which expressive conduct 
qualifies as proselytizing. 
Justice Douglas also discussed proselytizing in his 1962 concurrence 
in Engel v. Vitale.19 The Court in Engel held that New York’s 
requirement of a daily classroom invocation recounting God’s blessings 
constituted an unconstitutional “religious activity.”20 The Court 
determined that though student participation was not mandatory, use of 
the public school system to encourage recitation of such prayer was 
“wholly inconsistent” with the Establishment Clause.21 In his 
concurrence, Justice Douglas analyzed how Engel differed from 
McCollum and determined that though “New York’s prayer is of a 
character that does not involve any element of proselytizing as [was the 
case in] McCollum,” it was nonetheless a religious exercise.22 Thus, in 
Justice Douglas’s view, religious exercises were prohibited even if they 
did not rise to the level of proselytizing. 
Justice Douglas reiterated his version of the “no proselytizing” rule 
in another concurrence in 1963. In School District v. Schempp, the High 
Court invalidated on Establishment Clause grounds a school district 
policy requiring a Bible reading before regular instruction began each 
day.23 Justice Douglas, again in concurrence, focused on the problem of 
using public money to support proselytizing in a public institution: 
 
The most effective way to establish any institution is to finance it; and 
this truth is reflected in the appeals by church groups for public funds 
to finance their religious schools. Financing a church either in its 
strictly religious activities or in its other activities is equally 
unconstitutional, as I understand the Establishment Clause. Budgets for 
one activity may be technically separable from budgets for others. But 
 17. Id. at 209–10. 
 18. Id. at 235–36 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 19. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 20. Id. at 424. 
 21. Id. at 424, 430. 
 22. Id. at 439 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 23. 374 U.S. 203, 211, 224–25 (1963). 
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the institution is an inseparable whole, a living organism, which is 
strengthened in proselytizing when it is strengthened in any department 
by contributions from other than its own members.24
 
In 1971, Justice Douglas returned to his proselytizing analysis, this 
time joined by Justice Hugo Black, in the case that set forth the infamous 
“Lemon test.”25 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the majority invalidated on 
Establishment Clause grounds two state statutes, one from Rhode Island 
and one from Pennsylvania, that allowed direct state aid, or indirect 
beneficial aid, to parochial schools.26 In concurrence Justice Douglas 
stated 
 
“We must . . . be sure that the end result—the effect—is not an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.” 
 
There is in my view such an entanglement here. The surveillance or 
supervision of the States needed to police grants involved in these three 
cases, if performed, puts a public investigator in every classroom and 
entails a pervasive monitoring of these church agencies by the secular 
authorities. Yet if that surveillance or supervision does not occur the 
zeal of religious proselytizers promises to carry the day and make a 
shambles of the Establishment Clause.27
 
Justice Douglas’s view was that the Establishment Clause forbids the 
government from allowing “religious proselytizers” to “carry the day” at 
taxpayer expense where there is an indication the proselytizing may carry 
the imprimatur of the government.28
Although Justices Jackson and Douglas recited proselytizing 
analyses in these early concurrences, it was not until Marsh v. Chambers 
in 1983 that a Court majority alluded to a nascent “no proselytizing” 
rule.29 In Marsh, the Court upheld the historical practice of prayer before 
a Nebraska legislative session.30 One reason the Court gave for 
 24. Id. at 229 (footnotes omitted). 
 25. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (requiring that in order to be 
constitutional (1) “the statute must have a secular legislative purpose”; (2) “[the statute’s] principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances or inhibits religion”; and (3) “the statute must 
not foster an ‘excessive government entanglement with religion’”) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The Lemon test has subsequently had detractors and defenders on the 
High Court and though it has yet to be overruled, it is not always utilized by the Court in its analysis. 
 26. Id. at 606–07. 
 27. Id. at 627 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). 
 28. Id. 
 29. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 30. Id. at 784–785, 795. 
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upholding these prayers as constitutional was the non-proselytizing 
nature of historical prayers when the First Amendment was adopted.31 
The Court stated that “the delegates did not consider opening prayers as a 
proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing the government’s 
‘official seal of approval on one religious view.’”32 Further, the Court 
added, “[t]he content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as 
here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited 
to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief.”33 Here, the majority, in a frequently quoted statement, makes it 
clear that if the legislative opportunity for prayer had been exploited to 
proselytize, the content of the prayer would be of concern to the Court 
and the practice a potential violation of the Establishment Clause.34
Next, in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, a publisher of a nonreligious 
periodical brought suit challenging a Texas statute that provided a sales 
tax exemption for religious periodicals and not for nonreligious 
publications.35 The Court held that the statute violated the Establishment 
Clause and the majority opinion by Justice William Brennan states 
 
The core notion animating the requirement that a statute possess “a 
secular legislative purpose” and that “its principal or primary effect . . . 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” is not only that 
government may not be overtly hostile to religion but also that it may 
not place its prestige, coercive authority, or resources behind a single 
religious faith or behind religious belief in general, compelling 
nonadherents to support the practices or proselytizing of favored 
religious organizations and conveying the message that those who do 
not contribute gladly are less than full members of the community.36
 
Here the Court, echoing Justice Douglas’s earlier position indicates that 
not only is government proselytizing an Establishment Clause violation, 
but so is any government support, using tax-payer dollars, of 
proselytizing done by private individuals which might have an impact on 
non-adherents.  
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court’s use of proselytizing as 
 31. Id. at 792. 
 32. Id. (quoting Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
 33. Id. at 794–95. 
 34. In Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 398 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit recently 
cited Marsh when addressing whether the speaker of the Indiana House of Representatives could 
allow the opening of legislative sessions with sectarian prayer. The Seventh Circuit stated that 
Marsh precludes “sectarian prayer.” Id. at 399; See also discussion infra Part V.A. 
 35. 489 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1989). 
 36. Id. at 9 (citation omitted). 
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an Establishment Clause rule fell out of majority acceptance and seemed 
to drive a wedge between the emerging analytic approaches taken by 
Justices Anthony Kennedy (proselytizing as bottom line) and Sandra Day 
O’Connor (endorsement test).37 In that case, the High Court determined 
that a crèche inside a county courthouse violated the Establishment 
Clause, while menorahs outside city and county buildings did not.38 In 
his swing opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice 
Kennedy argued that both the crèche and the menorah withstood 
constitutional scrutiny.39 Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist and Justices Byron White and Antonin Scalia argued 
that the High Court should follow the precedent set by Marsh and allow 
the religious symbols because they were “non-proselytizing.”40 Further, 
the Kennedy opinion, which repudiated Justice O’Connor’s emerging 
“endorsement test” in favor of a proselytizing test, would determine 
whether government practice violated the Establishment Clause by 
asking whether the activity “would place the government’s weight 
behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular 
religion.”41 Justice Kennedy argued that both menorah and crèche were 
constitutional because “[t]here is no realistic risk that the crèche and the 
menorah represent an effort to proselytize or are otherwise the first step 
down the road to an establishment of religion.”42 However, the majority 
of the Court joined instead an opinion by Justice Harry Blackmun which 
vehemently rejected Justice Kennedy’s proposed analysis stating that all 
the suggested proselytizing test proposed to do was “to lower 
considerably the level of scrutiny in Establishment Clause cases.”43 
Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion indicated once again, that at the 
very least, proselytizing was a line that could not be crossed in a State-
sponsored activity. 
In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and 
shifted from the “no-proselytizing” analysis he utilized in County of 
Allegheny to a coercion-based approach.44 Justice Kennedy determined 
that participation in graduation prayer led by clergy was coerced 
participation in a “religious exercise.”45 This “religious exercise” strand 
would resurface in Santa Fe v. Doe, and subsequently in the Ninth 
 37. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 38. Id. at 621. 
 39. Id. at 667 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 40. Id. at 664, 665 n.4. 
 41. Id. at 661. 
 42. Id. at 664. 
 43. Id. at 609 (majority opinion). 
 44. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 45. Id. at 588. 
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Circuit opinions in Cole and Lassonde. Ironically, Justice Scalia in his 
vehement dissent, without using the term “proselytizing,” invoked the 
same bottom-line standard, stating 
 
[O]ur constitutional tradition, from the Declaration of Independence 
and the first inaugural address of Washington, quoted earlier, down to 
the present day, has, with a few aberrations, ruled out of order 
government-sponsored endorsement of religion—even when no legal 
coercion is present, and indeed even when no ersatz, “peer-pressure” 
psycho-coercion is present—where the endorsement is sectarian, in the 
sense of specifying details upon which men and women who believe in 
a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to 
differ (for example, the divinity of Christ).46
 
In the next key school student prayer case, Santa Fe v. Doe, the 
Court addressed the issue of student-led prayer prior to football games.47 
In ruling school prayer was an Establishment Clause violation, the 
majority opinion, penned by Justice Stevens, took note of the election 
procedures that allowed students first to decide if they wanted a student 
to deliver a prayer and then allowed them to select the student who 
would give the prayer.48 The Court majority further acknowledged that 
the series of school district policies and procedures at issue required that 
any such prayers must be “‘non-proselytizing’ invocations and 
benedictions for the purpose of ‘solemnizing’” the occasion.49 Despite 
these requirements, the Court majority, applying the same principles set 
forth in Lee, determined that the prayers were unconstitutional.50
Thus, pursuant to Lee and Santa Fe, even non-proselytizing prayer 
was held impermissible, which indicates that any school policy relating 
to student conduct which might qualify as school-sponsored religious 
activity has little chance of withstanding constitutional scrutiny unless it 
is, at the very minimum, non-proselytizing. Further, returning to 
Establishment Clause principles, the Court’s opinion in Santa Fe 
combined the “bottom-line” no-proselytizing rule with Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test, stressing that school sponsorship of this 
proselytizing message was impermissible because it sent the ancillary 
 46. Id. at 641 (citations omitted). This quote identifies Scalia’s “sectarian” or religiously 
neutral approach. If the State action is neutral towards religion and nonsectarian then, under this 
approach, it should be upheld. 
 47. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 48. Id. at 297–98. 
 49. Id. at 296-97. 
 50. Id. at 301–02, 317. 
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message to members of the audience who are non-adherents “that they 
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.”51
 
B.  Proselytizing and the Free Speech Clause 
 
In contrast to this line of Establishment Clause opinions stands the 
Free Speech Clause “viewpoint discrimination” cases, where the Court 
majority ignored proselytizing to affirm the constitutionality of the 
expression. Ironically, this shift led the liberal wing of the Court to focus 
on the neglected “no proselytizing” principle in dissent. 
For example, in Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. 
Pinette, Justice Stevens’s dissent turned to the proselytizing principle 
after the majority held that the State did not violate the Establishment 
Clause by allowing a private party (the Ku Klux Klan) to display an 
unattended cross on the grounds of the state capitol.52 Justice Stevens 
argued that 
 
The battle over the Klan cross underscores the power of such 
symbolism. The menorah prompted the Klan to seek permission to 
erect an anti-Semitic symbol, which in turn not only prompted 
vandalism but also motivated other sects to seek permission to place 
their own symbols in the square. These facts illustrate the potential for 
insidious entanglement that flows from state-endorsed proselytizing. 
There is no reason to believe that a menorah placed in front of a 
synagogue would have motivated any reaction from the Klan, or that a 
Klan cross placed on a Klansman’s front lawn would have produced the 
same reaction as one that enjoyed the apparent imprimatur of the 
State . . . .53
 
Next, in the key case of Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the 
University of Virginia, the Court majority determined that a university 
 51. Id. at 309-10 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
 52. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). In that case the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) brought suit seeking an 
injunction requiring the review board to issue a permit allowing the KKK to place a Latin cross in a 
plaza next to the state capitol. Id. at 758–59. The District Court granted the injunction and the 
Supreme Court held that issuing the permit did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 759, 770. 
Capital Square is a state-owned plaza that has been used for public gatherings, speeches, and 
festivals over the years. And, the Ohio Administrative Code makes this space freely available for use 
by the public. The Board has also permitted a variety of unattended displays such as a state-
sponsored tree during Christmas and a privately sponsored menorah during Chanukah. Id. at 757–58. 
 53. Id. at 811 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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engaged in impermissible “viewpoint discrimination” when it refused to 
pay the printing costs for a Christian student group that published a 
newspaper entitled “Wide Awake” out of a fund specifically created by 
the university to pay such costs for student publications.54 In 
Rosenberger, as a practical matter, the Free Speech Clause trumped the 
Establishment Clause.55 Again the dissent authored by Justice Souter and 
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer returned to a “no-
proselytizing” rule arguing that “[t]he Court, accordingly, has never 
before upheld direct state funding of the sort of proselytizing published 
in Wide Awake and, in fact, has categorically condemned state programs 
directly aiding religious activity.”56 Here the dissent argued that 
application of the “no proselytizing” rule is particularly obvious where 
the magazine is blatantly proselytizing. Yet, the Rosenberger majority 
opinion ignored the dissenter’s focus upon proselytizing, holding there 
had been no violation of the Establishment Clause, and that the 
University engaged in “viewpoint discrimination” by not funding the 
magazine.57
The High Court in Good News Club v. Milford Central School next 
held that a school’s refusal to allow a Christian club to use school 
facilities after school hours was unconstitutional “viewpoint 
discrimination” that was not necessary to avoid violating the 
Establishment Clause.58 Once again, the Free Speech Clause trumped the 
Establishment Clause. In dissent, Justice Stevens returned to the “subtle 
inquiry” Justices Jackson and Douglas had struggled with as early as 
1948, and identified three different categories of speech: “First, there is 
religious speech that is simply speech about a particular topic. . . . 
Second, there is religious speech that amounts to worship, or its 
equivalent. . . . Third, there is an intermediate category that is aimed 
principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular religious 
faith.”59 According to Justice Stevens, the type of proselytizing activities 
proposed by Good News Club fell into the third category of prohibited 
proselytizing speech.60 The justice wrote that “[d]istinguishing speech 
from a religious viewpoint, on the one hand, from religious proselytizing, 
on the other, is comparable to distinguishing meetings to discuss political 
issues from meetings whose principal purpose is to recruit new members 
 54. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 55. See id. at 846. 
 56. Id. at 874–75 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 845–46 (majority opinion). 
 58. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 59. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 133–34. 
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to join a political organization.”61 Justice Stevens further wrote that 
 
just as a school may allow meetings to discuss current events from a 
political perspective without also allowing organized political 
recruitment, so too can a school allow discussion of topics such as 
moral development from a religious (or nonreligious) perspective 
without thereby opening its forum to religious proselytizing or 
worship.62
 
In another dissent in Good News Club, Justice Souter joined by 
Justice Ginsberg stated that “Justice Stevens distinguishes between 
proselytizing and worship and distinguishes each from discussion 
reflecting a religious point of view. I agree with Justice Stevens that 
Good News’s activities may be characterized as proselytizing and 
therefore as outside the purpose of Milford’s limited forum.”63 
Responding to the dissent’s critiques in an aside, the majority opinion 
dismissed both Justices Stevens’s and Souter’s points and responded to 
Justice Stevens’s view by arguing that even if Good News’s speech “is 
speech ‘aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a 
particular religious faith,’ [t]his does not, to begin with, distinguish 
Rosenberger, which also involved proselytizing speech.”64 But the 
question unanswered by the majority opinion remains that if both 
Rosenberger and Good News Club admittedly approve proselytizing 
speech, how does that outcome square with previous Establishment 
Clause principles or precedent barring proselytizing? 
Thus, in Rosenberger and in Good News Club, the High Court gave 
the “green light” to what would, in other circumstances, be deemed 
Establishment Clause prohibited expression. The practical conundrum 
for school officials and teachers who have to enforce these judicial 
rulings is simple: is religious-oriented student speech or expression 
protected from “viewpoint discrimination” by the Free Speech Clause, or 
is it instead proselytizing prohibited by the Establishment Clause? Or, 
perhaps more simply, under what circumstances does religious 
expression fall into Free Speech or Establishment Clause territory? 
 
 61. Id. at 131. 
 62. Id. at 132. 
 63. Id. at 138 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). A “forum” analysis is beyond the 
scope of this article. Briefly, what level of First Amendment Free Speech Clause protection speech is 
afforded may depend upon the forum created by the government, which ranges from “open” public 
forum to a “limited open” to “closed non-public forum.” See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–49 (1983). 
 64. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 125–26 (citation omitted). 
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C.  The Ten Commandments Cases and Proselytizing 
 
The basic question remains whether a “no proselytizing” rule, 
including a clearly adopted judicial definition of “proselytizing,” could 
be the bottom-line which differentiates Establishment Clause 
prohibitions from Free Speech Clause precluded “viewpoint 
discrimination.” 
Unfortunately, the two Ten Commandments cases from the 2005 
term did not provide such a bottom-line test. In these cases, the Justices 
again took note of the nascent “no proselytizing” rule in both concurring 
and dissenting opinions, but did little to resolve this doctrinal dilemma. 
In both cases the Court examined the constitutionality of Ten 
Commandments displays located on government property. In these cases, 
the legal principle of “no proselytizing” appears to have been degraded 
to a question of fact, or mixed question of law and fact, rather than a 
conclusion of law, in both the concurring and dissenting opinions.65
In Van Orden v. Perry, the Court upheld as constitutional the display 
of the Ten Commandments on a monument at the Texas State Capitol.66 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated, “[T]here is nothing 
unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God 
through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a non-proselytizing 
manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.”67 As in Lee, Justice 
Scalia’s statements indicate that the converse, then, may be true: there is 
something unconstitutional with a State honoring God in a proselytizing 
manner. Justice Souter disagreed that the speech qualified as non-
proselytizing, noting in dissent: 
 
There is no question that the State in its own right is broadcasting the 
religious message. When Texas accepted the monument from the 
Eagles, the state legislature, aware that the Eagles “for the past several 
years have placed across the country . . . parchment plaques and granite 
monoliths of the Ten Commandments . . . [in order] to promote youth 
morality and help stop the alarming increase in delinquency,” . . . 
expressly approved of the Eagles’ proselytizing, which it made on its 
 65. Establishment Clause cases are usually decided at the appellate level as a matter of law 
pursuant to a de novo standard. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). A mixed question of law and fact is usually reviewed de novo as well. 
See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-04 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other 
grounds by Estate of Merchant v. Comm’r, 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991). A purely factual issue is 
subject to the lesser “clearly erroneous” standard of review. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 
U.S. 273, 287 (1982). 
 66. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
 67. Id. at 2864 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
  




So, in Van Orden, the question remains as to whether Texas acted in a 
“non-proselytizing manner,”69 or had “expressly approved of the Eagles 
proselytizing.”70
In the companion case of McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court 
came to the opposite result and found that the Ten Commandments 
displays in Kentucky courthouses were unconstitutional.71 Justice Scalia 
again discussed proselytizing, this time in dissent, stating that “there is 
no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to 
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief.”72 This statement again indicates Justice Scalia himself believes 
that when an opportunity for prayer is used to proselytize, that prayer 
opportunity cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. No other opinion in 
McCreary addressed proselytizing, or a “no proselytizing” rule. 
 
D.  The Term Proselytizing Has Served As An Ill-Defined Operating 
Assumption In Supreme Court Opinions 
 
As this review illustrates, from the beginning of modern 
Establishment Clause case law, public taxpayer sponsored proselytizing 
stood beyond the pale in judicial opinions and was assumed to be 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.73 Even Justice Scalia, in his 
vehement dissents exemplified in Lee and McCreary, acknowledges 
“sectarian” speech goes too far.74 Perhaps the high point of an emerging 
“no proselytizing” rule was Justice Kennedy’s opinion in County of 
Allegheny in which he attempted, but failed, to have the Court formally 
adopt an explicit “no proselytizing” bedrock rule.75 But, almost 
inexplicably, in the “viewpoint discrimination” line of cases, what was 
termed “proselytizing” speech by dissenting justices passes muster under 
the Free Speech Clause, and the government itself is prohibited from 
engaging in “viewpoint discrimination.”76
In summary, the term “proselytizing” in High Court opinions has 
 68. Id. at 2893 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 2864 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 2893 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 71. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
 72. Id. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S 783, 794–95 
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 73. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 74. See discussion supra Parts II.A, at p. 10, II.C, at p. 17. 
 75. See discussion supra Part II.A, at pp. 8–10. 
 76. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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been used as an operating assumption, e.g., a description of what speech 
a particular justice believes crosses the Establishment Clause line as a 
matter of law. But “proselytizing” has never been adequately defined, or 
adopted as an identifiable legal test, by a majority of the Court. This 
reality is well illustrated by Justices Scalia and Souter reviewing the 
same photographs of the Ten Commandments monument in Texas, yet 
differing as to whether the monument is proselytizing or not.77
 
III.  NINTH CIRCUIT: COLE AND LASSONDE 
 
The Ninth Circuit has built upon the Court’s Establishment Clause 
precedent to adopt a more certain “no proselytizing” doctrine than either 
the Court or other federal judicial circuits in Cole v. Oroville Union High 
School District78 and Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified School District.79 
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit made clear that proselytizing student 
speech is prohibited (at least during public high school graduation 
ceremonies) by the Establishment Clause and its requirements of 
separation between church and state. 
In Cole, the Ninth Circuit confronted a proposed speech by co-
valedictorian Chris Niemeyer in a Northern California high school 
graduation ceremony.80 The court analyzed the speech and found it both 
 77. See discussion supra Part II.C. Given this split, it is possible the concept of proselytizing 
now encompasses mixed determinations of law and fact. This question for practitioners may 
determine evidentiary burdens at trial and opportunity for success on appeal. 
 78. 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
 79. 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003).
 80. Cole, 228 F.3d 1092. Mr. Niemeyer’s second proposed speech was titled “The Key to 
Success” and stated as follows: 
 
Before I start tonight, I want to extend my gratitude to Oroville High School and its staff 
for the great learning experience I have had the past four years. Along with the great 
instruction I have also been introduced to ideas and philosophies that have not 
corresponded with my own personal beliefs. I now have the opportunity to speak from 
my heart and share what I know is the key to success. I should warn you that the G-word 
and J-word may appear in my speech – God and Jesus. If you are harshly offended by my 
convictions, I would like to give you the opportunity to leave. Any takers? Again, my 
intent is not to force my ideas or offend anyone, but rather, to encourage everyone on this 
occasion. 
Tonight, as we gather to celebrate this moment in our lives, I want to propose and ask 
you to respond to three questions; they can apply to all in attendance—who  are we?, 
why are we here?, and where are we going? 
Who are we? On this memorable occasion, we are graduates, family, teachers, and 
friends, most looking toward the future for success. During high school, I have come to 
believe that there are three types of people in this world. Some see a glass as half full. 
Others see it as half empty. And then there are those who just don’t see the glass. But we 
are a people with busy lives and diverse backgrounds, yet deep inside each of us we are 
all in search of true happiness and something worth living for. Although we strive for 
perfection, we constantly fall short. Some of us merely exist, some struggle to make it 
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sectarian and proselytizing.81 Prior to graduation, Mr. Niemeyer 
proposed two draft speeches for approval by the principal—an original 
and a modified version.82 Both speeches were rejected by the principal, 
school superintendent, and legal counsel, and the student eventually sued 
school officials for damages claiming “viewpoint discrimination” 
violative of the Rosenberger line of cases.83 In addition to the actual 
language of the speeches in the record, the Ninth Circuit panel was aware 
that Mr. Niemeyer had admitted in deposition testimony that if an 
audience member found Jesus or God as a result of his proposed speech, 
it would be a good result.84 Additionally, in his deposition Mr. Niemeyer 
stated that the fundamental purpose of his speech was to praise God and 
glorify him through the words.85 Mr. Niemeyer also admitted his 
proposed speech was testifying, witnessing, and preaching.86
First, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the school district retained 
plenary authority over the graduation ceremony.87 Thus, restricting the 
from one day to the next. Some succeed at most everything we attempt. All of us long for 
love and acceptance. I believe as a whole, we share one distinct similarity – the one, and 
only, perfect God created us. Each of us has value. We are all God’s children, through 
Jesus Christ’ death, when we accept His free love and saving grace in our lives. 
Why are we here? What is our purpose for existence? It has been said that until you 
have found something worth dying for, you are not really living. We have all been given 
our lives by God, in order to glorify Him. I believe that God has a plan for each one of 
our lives – a plan to prosper us and give us a hope for the future. As individuals, we have 
a choice, of whether to choose His perfect will in our lives or our own futile plans. 
But whatever our plans and dreams are, I believe they will not fully succeed unless we 
pattern our lives after Jesus’ example. 
Where are we going? We do not know what tomorrow holds. Some of us may leave 
here tonight and become doctors, lawyers, or teachers. One of us may find a cure for aids 
or cancer or we may discover a technological breakthrough. Most of us desire to be 
successful, contribute to society, and make a difference. However, as we leave tonight 
and go our separate ways, may we remember one thing: God seeks a personal 
relationship with each one of us, as He longs for us to live forever with Him. Jesus wants 
to be our best friend. When others let us down - He will not. If we let Him direct our 
lives, He will give us the desires of our heart. Do you look to the future with uncertainty 
or confidence, fear or peace? Whether a graduate, family member, teacher, or friend, I 
encourage you to accept God’s love and grace. We must yield to God our lives and let 
Him direct our future paths. For with God, you will find eternal happiness and absolute 
success in all that you do. 
 
Supplemental Excerpts of Record at 187-89, Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 
(9th Cir. 2000) (Case No. 99-16550) [hereinafter SER]. 
 81. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1097, 1103–04.
 82. Id. at 1096. 
 83. Id. at 1096–97, 1101. 
 84. SER, supra note 80, at 30, Undisputed Facts ¶ 79. 
 85. SER, supra note 80, at 30, Undisputed Facts ¶ 73.
 86. SER, supra note 80, at 30–31, Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 74–77, 84. 
 87. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1103. By finding “plenary authority,” the Ninth Circuit is ruling the 
forum “closed.” See supra note 63 regarding forum analysis. 
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proposed co-valedictorian speech was “necessary to avoid violating the 
Establishment Clause”88 because allowing Mr. Niemeyer to give his 
proposed speech “would have constituted government endorsement of 
religious speech similar to the prayer policies found unconstitutional in 
Santa Fe and Lee.”89 The court rationalized that an “objective observer 
familiar with the District’s policy and its implementation would have 
likely perceived that the speech carried the District’s seal of approval.”90 
These principles, set forth in Santa Fe and Lee, are also consistent with 
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test. 
Secondly, the Ninth Circuit held “proselytizing, no less than prayer, 
is a religious practice.”91 To reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit 
relied upon High Court precedent for the proposition that proselytizing 
itself is a “religious activity.”92  Taking Santa Fe and Lee to the next 
step, the court determined that the secondary test is whether a reasonable 
dissenter could believe that the group religious activity at a major public 
school event signified his or her own promotion or approval.93 Finally, 
the court concluded that “allowing the students to engage in sectarian 
prayer and proselytizing as part of the graduation ceremony would 
amount to government sponsorship of, and coercion to participate in, 
particular religious practices.”94
Three years later the Ninth Circuit reiterated that Cole was binding 
precedent in Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified School District.95  In that 
case, the court turned aside another “viewpoint discrimination” attack 
upon school district officials, this time based upon the then recent U.S. 
 88. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1101 (citing Santa Fe Indp. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)). 
 89. Id. at 1103. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1104. 
 92. Id. (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 23 (1989)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. There did exist a slightly different analytical approach to this situation. In Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Court held that students retained First 
Amendment free speech rights, in that case to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. 393 
U.S. 503, 504, 514 (1969). However, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court held that 
educators do not violate the First Amendment when exercising control over style and content of 
student speech in faculty-supervised activities so long as the educator’s actions are “reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). Speech sponsored by the 
school is thus subject to “greater control” by school authorities than speech not so sponsored. Id. at 
271–73. In Cole, the District Court below relied upon Kuhlmeier to rule that the Oroville Union 
High School District retained curriculum authority over the graduation ceremony, and could lawfully 
disapprove the speech. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., No. Civ. S-98-1037, slip op. at 16–
17 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 1999). The trial court merely noted school approval of the proposed speech 
would implicate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 19 n.8. Despite briefing and argument on this point, 
the Ninth Circuit focused solely upon the Establishment Clause. 
 95. 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Supreme Court opinion in Good News Club.96 In Lassonde, another 
Northern California high school graduation speaker sought to deliver a 
“proselytizing” speech at his graduation. However, this case differed 
slightly from Cole because the school district excised certain 
proselytizing language from Mr. Lassonde’s speech, though the student’s 
counsel had proposed a disclaimer as the appropriate device to deliver 
the original speech intact.97 Eventually the student delivered the excised 
speech without a disclaimer, with unedited versions available for 
distribution.98 Not satisfied with this result, Mr. Lassonde sued school 
district officials for damages.99
The key argument offered by the student’s counsel in Lassonde was 
that the “viewpoint discrimination” doctrine as applied in Good News 
Club vitiated Cole.100 The Ninth Circuit rejected this approach and ruled 
“Good News Club did not undermine Cole.”101 In reaching this 
conclusion the court restated the “two related, but subtly distinct, 
reasons” which necessitated the school district’s actions in Cole as (1) 
“[T]he school district had to censor the speech in order to avoid the 
appearance of government sponsorship of religion”; and (2) “[A]llowing 
the speech would have had an impermissibly coercive effect on 
dissenters, requiring them to participate in a religious practice even by 
their silence.”102 In rejecting the student’s attempts to distinguish Cole 
based upon the proposed disclaimer, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a 
disclaimer could not address the other ground underlying both Cole and 
Lee: permitting a proselytizing speech at a public school’s graduation 
ceremony would amount to coerced participation in a religious 
practice.”103 Thus, allowing Mr. Lassonde’s speech during graduation 
would be enough to coerce the audience into religious participation. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit in Lassonde distinguished the Good News 
“viewpoint discrimination” holding that after-hours meetings do not bear 
the imprimatur of the school, while graduation ceremonies require “the 
participation of all, as a captive audience.”104
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Cole mentioned “sectarian” twenty-nine 
times and “proselytizing” seventeen times.105 Similarly, the Lassonde 
 96. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 97. Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 981. 
 98. Id. at 982. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 985. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 983. 
 103. Id. at 984. 
 104. Id. at 985. 
 105. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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court applied the term “sectarian” six times and “proselytizing” fourteen 
times.106 Both decisions squarely rule that proselytizing is a religious 
exercise, the proposed practice of which required that the school district 
censor student speech to be delivered to a captive audience in school-
sponsored activities.107 Yet, at no point in either decision is proselytizing 
defined as a legal term of art, much less as an applicable test. Perhaps 
this was because the speakers at issue were manifestly proselytizing in 
the proposed speeches under almost any conceivable meaning given to 
the word. Yet this definitional omission does carry consequences. Public 
officials must make the initial judgment call whether speech is prohibited 
proselytizing. The courts may secondarily review this judgment call. A 
more certain definition of proselytizing would resolve vexing questions, 
assist Establishment Clause certainty, and limit unintended incursions 
into “viewpoint discrimination” by public officials. 
 
IV.  TOWARDS A WORKABLE DEFINITION OF PROSELYTIZING 
 
A.  Other Federal Circuits Consider Proselytizing 
 
Despite the “no proselytizing” rule outlined in Cole and Lassonde, as 
noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit did not define the term in either opinion. 
Other federal circuit opinions have delved somewhat more deeply into 
defining the term “proselytizing” as a legal principal when applied to 
discrete facts.108
In the Third Circuit decision Child Evangelism Fellowship of New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Stafford Township School District, a religious organization 
sought an injunction against particular elementary schools that denied 
that organization access to school grounds to promote meetings and 
activities.109 Though that case turned on a forum analysis and whether 
prohibiting use by the religious group constituted “viewpoint 
discrimination,”110 the appellate court included a dictionary definition of 
proselytizing. Using the Webster’s definition, the Third Circuit 
determined that to proselytize means: “‘to recruit members for an 
institution, team, or group’ and ‘to convert from one religion, belief, 
 106. Lassonde, 320 F.3d 979. 
 107. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1103–04; Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 983–84. 
 108. See, e.g., Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating 
that not every speaker at a high school graduation should be considered a state speaker); Chandler v. 
Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (determining that private speech is constitutionally 
protected even though it occurs at a school related function). 
 109. 386 F.3d 514, 522–23 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 110. Id. at 526. 
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opinion or party to another.’”111 The appellate court did not adopt a 
blanket “no proselytizing” rule similar to the Ninth Circuit’s rule 
articulated in Cole and Lassonde. However, the Third Circuit analyzed 
the case under its stated definition and determined the problem with the 
school district’s practice was that they did not reject non-religious groups 
that proselytized in the sense of “recruiting members,” but excluded only 
“religiously affiliated groups that attempt to recruit new members.”112 
The Third Circuit held that this stance by the schools constituted 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.113 Because this case did not 
address student speech, it did not preclude the adoption of a “no 
proselytizing” rule in that context. 
The Third Circuit added to its proselytizing analysis in Walz v. Egg 
Harbor Township Board of Education114 where it reasoned as follows: 
 
Context is essential in evaluating student speech in the elementary 
school setting. It would seem reasonable that student expression may 
implicate religion if done out of personal observance as opposed to 
outward promotion. There is a marked difference between expression 
that symbolizes individual religious observance, such as wearing a 
cross on a necklace, and expression that proselytizes a particular 
view.115
 
Thus, examining both of these Third Circuit cases together, the court 
appears to be heading toward a bright line “no proselytizing” rule where 
student speech is concerned, even though it has yet to be articulated as 
such. 
In the Fifth Circuit opinion in Santa Fe v. Doe, the appellate court 
implicitly adopted the “no proselytizing” rule for graduation speeches.116 
The appellate court, in the portion of the case which was not reviewed by 
the Supreme Court when it granted certiorari, addressed the problem of 
 111. Id. at 528 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1821 (1976)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. The Supreme Court has not settled the question whether a concern about a possible 
Establishment Clause violation can justify viewpoint discrimination. In Good News Club, the Court 
stated, “We have said that a state interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation ‘may be 
characterized as compelling,’ and therefore may justify content-based discrimination. However, it is 
not clear whether a State’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify 
viewpoint discrimination.” Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2001) 
(citation omitted). 
 114. 342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 115. Id. at 278–79 (citing Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 
2003) (footnote omitted)). 
 116. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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proselytizing speech in graduation ceremonies.117  In Santa Fe, the Fifth 
Circuit defined “proselytizing prayers” as prayers “designed to reflect, 
and even convert others to, a particular religious viewpoint.”118 Applying 
that definition, the Fifth Circuit determined that proselytizing prayer 
“conveys a message not only that the government endorses religion, but 
that it endorses a particular form of religion,” a practice which is, at the 
least, constitutionally questionable.119 Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that 
“student-selected, student-given, sectarian, proselytizing invocations and 
benedictions at high school graduations . . . [are] antithetical to the 
Establishment Clause.”120
The Fourth Circuit has also defined proselytizing and attempted to 
distinguish it from the similar concept of “advancing religion.” In Wynne 
v. Town of Great Falls, South Carolina,121 the Fourth Circuit addressed 
prayer during city council meetings and held that those particular prayers 
run afoul of the Establishment Clause as interpreted by Marsh.122 In its 
analysis, the appellate court cited to Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary and stated that to “‘proselytize’ on behalf of a particular 
religious belief necessarily means to seek to ‘convert’ others to that 
belief.”123 The court reasoned that because Marsh prohibits prayers that 
either “proselytize or advance one . . . faith or belief,”124 not only are 
proselytizing prayers prohibited, but also prohibited are “legislative 
prayers that have the effect of affiliating the government with any one 
specific faith or belief.”125 Further, the court determined that mere 
mention of Jesus Christ to the exclusion of other potential deities 
indicated an effort to advance one faith.126 Though the Fourth Circuit has 
yet to use this definition in its Establishment Clause analysis in the 
public school arena, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, the 
Establishment Clause protections are especially heightened in the school 
context because children and “adolescents are often susceptible to 
pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is 
strongest in matters of social convention.”127 Thus, the Fourth Circuit 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 817. 
 119. Id. at 817–18. 
 120. Id. at 818. 
 121. 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 122. Id. at 298 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983)). 
 123. Id. at 300. 
 124. Id. at 297 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95)). 
 125. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
603 (1989)). 
 126. Id. at 301. 
 127. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) (quoting Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992)). 
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would be even more likely to find proselytizing speech, within the public 
school environment, an Establishment Clause violation. 
The Eleventh Circuit, though not defining the term, has also used 
“proselytizing” as an important factor in determining whether an 
Establishment Clause violation has occurred. For example, in Chandler 
v. Siegelman the Eleventh Circuit upheld the validity an Alabama statute 
that permitted non-sectarian and non-proselytizing student-initiated 
prayer at school-related events.128 The court held that where prayer is 
“genuinely student-initiated” and is not a result of a school policy that 
“actively or surreptitiously encourages” the speech, that prayer is 
constitutional.129 Nonetheless, the court still recognized the bottom line 
that even student-initiated proselytizing speech is not constitutionally 
allowable, stating “Proselytizing speech is inherently coercive and the 
Constitution prohibits it from the government’s pulpit.”130 Additionally, 
in Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach County, another Eleventh 
Circuit opinion, the court addressed the validity of religious words and 
symbols painted on murals as part of a school beautification project.131 
The court noted that the appellant’s argument “would have us adopt a 
reading of [Rosenberger and Lamb’s Chapel] that would require a 
school . . . to allow students to use the walls of a public school to 
proselytize.”132 The Eleventh Circuit, appearing to think that this notion 
was out of the realm of possibility, disposed of this argument in one 
sentence and held that “neither case mandate[d] such a result.”133
 
B.  Formulating the Definition 
 
If public schools and other public institutions are thus prohibited by 
the Establishment Clause from sponsoring the religious exercise of 
proselytizing, the critical question becomes what conduct precisely 
constitutes proselytizing.134 An “I know it when I see it” judicial standard 
 128. Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated, Chandler v. Siegelman, 530 
U.S. 1256 (2000). The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded it to be read in light of 
Santa Fe. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit held that the first Chandler opinion was not in conflict 
with Santa Fe and that the Santa Fe opinion was limited to the condemnation of school sponsorship 
of prayer while the Chandler opinion condemns school censorship of student prayer. Chandler v. 
Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 129. Chandler, 230 F.3d at 1317. 
 130. Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1265. 
 131. 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 132. Id. at 1216 (referring to Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 
(1995), and Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. For example, several distinguished professors and commentators came to quite different 
conclusions on how the situation in Cole should have been addressed. See, e.g., Symposium, The 
State Suppression of Student Prayer, 5 NEXUS 1 (2000). 
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does nothing to assist school administrators, teachers, or other public 
officials from being sued for damages after making difficult judgment 
calls.135
Non-court sources appear to muddy, rather than clear, the waters. For 
example, the Association of International Educators defines proselytizing 
in its Code of Ethics as “unsolicited, coercive, manipulative and/or 
hidden persuasion that seeks to influence others to adopt another way of 
thinking, believing, or behaving.”136 Accordingly, “[i]n [r]elationships 
with [s]tudents, [s]cholars, and [o]thers[,] [m]embers [s]hall: . . . [n]ot 
use one’s position to proselytize.”137 But such an academic definition 
focuses heavily upon the mental state of the speaker, an approach at odds 
with the “reasonable observer” judicial standard.138 Recent proposed 
federal legislation regarding specifically the United States Air Force 
Academy simplistically attempted to restrict “coercive and abusive 
religious proselytizing.”139 This begs the question: how does one define 
“coercive and abusive” in this context, and can proselytizing at taxpayer 
expense ever not be at least coercive? Silence does not help: the United 
States Department of Education Guidance on Constitutionally Protected 
Prayer in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools makes no mention 
of the term “proselytizing” or any similar terms such as 
“evangelizing.”140
Considering all of these approaches from both the courts and non-
legal sources, a concise definition of proselytizing for deciding questions 
of fact or reaching conclusions of law might be expressive activity which 
a reasonable observer would perceive attempts to convert the audience 
from one religious belief, or lack of a belief, to another religious belief, 
or lack thereof. 
 135. See, e.g., Wynne v. Great Falls, S.C., 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)). 
 136. NAFSA: ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATORS, NAFSA’S CODE OF ETHICS, at 
2, 3(f) (Mar. 9, 2003), http://www.nafsa.org/about.sec/governance_leadership/ethics_standards/nafsa 
_s_code_of_ethics (last visited May 6, 2006). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Conner, J., concurring); see also 
Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591–93, 597–99 (1992)). 
 139. See 151 Cong. Rec. H4761 (daily ed. June 20, 2005) (proposed amendment to H.R. 2863, 
sponsored by Rep. David R. Obey ). After agreeing to the Obey amendment, the amendment failed 
passage by recorded vote 198–210. Id. at H4779. 
 140. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, GUIDANCE ON CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
PRAYER IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (Feb. 7, 2003), 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/religionandschools/prayer_guidance.html (last visited Oct. 16, 
2006) (discussing prayer at graduation and stating—contrary to Cole and Lassonde—that students 
who offer a religious message at graduation will not violate the establishment clause if the students 
are chosen using a truly neutral criteria because the speech is not attributable to the school). 
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C.  Applying the Definition: An Objective Standard 
 
The Cole case presents the type of factual “real life” conflict any 
proposed definition of “proselytizing” must adequately address to be of 
use to public officials and the courts.141Mr. Niemeyer in that situation 
was co-valedictorian along with Ms. Delisa Freistadt. Ms. Freistadt was 
concerned Mr. Niemeyer and Mr. Cole might try to use the graduation 
ceremony to recruit others to their religious views.142 Ms. Freistadt’s 
parents thereafter objected to sectarian references, including reference to 
Jesus, in the graduation ceremony.143 Deposition testimony established 
unquestionably that Mr. Niemeyer was “testifying,” “witnessing,” and 
acting as an active evangelical proponent of his faith in attempting to 
give his speech.144 Evangelical activity during the school day by Mr. 
Niemeyer and his Bible study club had negatively affected Ms. Freistadt 
during her high school tenure.145 Ms. Freistadt knew the faculty advisors 
and the school principal must approve all speeches prior to 
presentation.146 Ms. Freistadt believed she should have been able “to 
graduate as co-valedictorian of [her] class without being subjected to 
offensive religious proselytizing.”147 Ms. Freistadt and her fellow 
students would have known that Mr. Niemeyer’s statements received the 
official government stamp of approval prior to presentation.148 During 
such a speech the government would be placing Ms. Freistadt and other 
members of the audience in the untenable position of feeling like 
“outsiders.”149 Such a direct assault upon personal religious sensibilities 
under the auspices of the State would have been an affront to both Justice 
Kennedy’s “coercion test” and Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” test. It 
would have substantially failed even Justice Scalia’s “sectarian” 
approach exemplified by his dissent in Lee.150
Thus, to adequately address these types of “real life” conflicts, this 
article-proposed definition is minimally subjective and primarily 
 141. SER, supra note 80, at 60-62, Freistadt Decl. ¶¶ 1–18. 
 142. SER, supra note 80, at 27, Undisputed Facts ¶ 47. 
 143. SER, supra note 80, at 27, Undisputed Facts ¶ 48.
 144. SER, supra note 80, at 30–31, Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 74–77, 84. 
 145. SER, supra note 80, at 61, Freistadt Decl. ¶ 5.
 146. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 147. SER, supra note 80, at 62, Freistadt Decl. ¶ 18. 
 148. SER, supra note 80, at 61–62, Freistadt Decl. ¶¶ 7–14. 
 149. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburg Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 150. See supra note 46. 
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objective. Folding this proposed definition into a workable test, public 
official(s) initially, and the court(s) secondarily, would consider (1) the 
nature of the expressive activity; (2) to a limited extent, the speaker’s 
purpose, e.g., whether he or she is involved in an effort to convert; and, 
most conclusively, (3) the potential objective impact upon the reasonable 
observer. 
Based upon current case law involving public school-sponsored 
activities, if the sponsored expressive activity is per se a religious 
exercise or practice, e.g., prayer, it is assumed proselytizing as a matter 
of law and the analysis concludes.151 Next, if the speaker as a factual 
matter admits intent to convert, as did Mr. Niemeyer in Cole, then under 
the proposed test the expression would violate the Establishment Clause. 
Finally, if either factor one or two is not conclusive, the public official 
initially, and the court secondarily, would examine the potential impact 
upon the audience (or other participants in the activity) from the 
standpoint of the reasonable observer as a matter of law. This third factor 
includes whether the particular audience is “captive,” and the nature of 
the precise forum, if any, created by the public agency.152 This proposed 
approach to determining what speech or expression is proselytizing and 
thereby prohibited by the Establishment Clause is consistent with High 
Court precedent and opinions from McCollum to Santa Fe set forth 
above, as well as the federal circuit decisions to date. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The High Court has declined to accept review of several Circuit 
decisions in which proselytizing was either key to the case or at least 
mentioned in the Circuit panel’s opinion.153 Without a definitive 
Supreme Court opinion, there remains some room for doubt whether the 
per se approach prohibiting proselytizing adopted by the Ninth Circuit in 
Cole and Lassonde will ultimately prevail. The differing High Court 
opinions in the two 2005 term Ten Commandment cases shed little light 
on this question.154 But, it becomes difficult to envision a different 
standard towards proselytizing than that mandated by the Ninth Circuit, 
at least in public schools, so long as Lee and Santa Fe remain precedent. 
 151. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992); Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003); Cole, 228 F.3d 
1092.
 152. See supra note 63, regarding forum analysis. 
 153. Cole, 228 F.3d 1092 ; Lassonde, 320 F.3d 979; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290; Chandler v. 
Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 154. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 
2854 (2005). 
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Why such an assertion? Why should proselytizing at taxpayer 
expense be treated differently than other forms of Free Speech Clause 
protected expression? Why does conduct that would in other 
circumstances be considered protected Free Speech instead become 
Establishment Clause prohibited activity in public schools or other public 
institutions? The answer is that proselytizing by its very nature is a direct 
assault upon the religious identity, or lack of religious identity, of one or 
more members of an audience by a speaker using a government-
sponsored and government-controlled platform. 
This conclusion does not presume that the courts or public officials 
must sanitize religion, or all religious expression, from public or civic 
life.155 To the contrary, it is possible to envision personal references to 
religion in a graduation speech, for example, which are not 
proselytizing.156 What it does assert is that proselytizing, by its very 
nature, goes too far and crosses the Establishment Clause line.157
Civic life must eventually evolve an acceptable etiquette for public 
ceremonies.158 The ethic of tolerance, however described, lies at the heart 
of such etiquette.159 An ethic of mutual tolerance pre-supposes the ability 
to listen to one another without censorship or condemnation.160 However, 
it stretches tolerance too far to presume a person must listen to 
statements from a government-supplied podium that attack his or her 
very identity as a religious, or non-religious, person. An ethic of mutual 
tolerance in such circumstances focuses upon the ethical obligations of 
the speaker and becomes an off-shoot of the Golden Rule: if you do not 
want someone to directly or indirectly attack your own religion, do not 
directly or indirectly attack others’ religion (or lack thereof). Because 
such an ethic may be difficult to follow in the heat of the moment, the 
Establishment Clause would enforce it through the bottom-line “no 
proselytizing” rule as adopted by the Ninth Circuit. 
 
 155. Christian M. Keiner, A Critical Analysis of Continuing Establishment Clause Flux as 
Illustrated by Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) and Graduation Prayer Case Law: Can 
Mutual Tolerance Reconcile Dynamic Principles of Religious Diversity and Human Commonality?, 
24 PAC. L.J. 401, 457–60 (1993). 
 156. An “I” message would be far different than Mr. Niemeyer’s “we” message differentiating 
who is, and who is not, “God’s children” directed toward the entire captive audience, e.g., “We are 
all God’s children, through Jesus Christ’ death, when we accept His free love and saving grace in 
our lives.” See note 80 above for the entire speech. 
 157. Keiner, supra note 155, at 457. 
 158. See generally, Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and Religious Expression at High School 
Graduations: Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society, 5 NEXUS 61 (2000); see also Noah 
Feldman, A Church-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 3, 2005, at 28. 
 159. Keiner, supra note 155, at 457–59. 
 160. Id. 
